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1. WHY POLICY TOWARD EV AND V2G?
All market failures are combined to hinder the development of the Electric 
Vehicle (EV) industry. EV and Vehicle to Grid (V2G) activities are pledged 
by absence of provision of public good, by difficult positive and negative 
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of funding institutions they work with. Authors would like to thank for 
their valuable comments the participants of the FAEE seminar in Paris la Défense 
(2012), in EVS 27 conference in Barcelona (2013), in Friday lunch seminar of Chaire 
Économie du Climat, Université Paris-Dauphine (2013) in the Innovation seminar 
at RITM Paris-Sud (2014) and lastly in the FAERE first conference in Montpellier 
(2014). Authors would like also to thanks Anna Creti, Christian de Perthuis, Jean-
Michel Glachant, Alain Ayong Le Kama, Vincent Rious and Carole Donada, for their 
contribution on earlier versions of the paper. All remaining errors are ours.
† College of Earth, Ocean, and Environment, Center for Carbon-free Power Integration, 
and Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Delaware, 
USA. willett@udel.edu.
‡ Corresponding author: Supélec & University Paris-Sud, RITM, and Research Fellow 
at Armand Peugeot Chair. yannick.perez@supelec.fr.
§ Department of Power and Energy Systems E3S SUPELEC Systems Sciences and head 
of the Armand Peugeot Chair, marc.petit@supelec.fr.
PUBLIC POLICY FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES AND FOR VEHICLE TO GRIDPOWER
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 148  ➻  4 E TR IMESTRE 2014264
externalities management, by a possible war standard between different 
companies in the early development of the industry and finally, by the 
presence of learning-by-doing dynamics.
The presence of these multiple problems has driven some governments to 
develop EV policies to overcome these market failures after multiple try 
and errors in this industry in the 60th, 70th and in the 90th (Kloess, 2011). 
Society has multiple common interests in the success of EVs. They provide a 
partial solution toprotecting collective public goods like local public health 
(via reduced urban air pollution), reducing NOx and CO2 emissions and 
thus helping to stabilize climate, providing domestic supply of transport 
fuel, thus increasing energy security, energy independence and reducing 
the impact of oil price fluctuations. Even without a proactive public policy 
toward EVs diffusion, Policy-makers also need to plan ahead into the era of 
EVs, to prepare for future problems and opportunities related to the elec-
tric power system facing with new decentralized storage opportunity.
For example, large fractions of EVs could overload electric generation (region-
ally) or electric distribution systems (locally). One of the goals of the nation 
governance structures is to anticipate the needed evolution of the natural 
monopoly electrical network in a proactive way when needed (Rious, Perez 
and Glachant, 2011). In a more innovative way, EV fleets could be managed 
to provide decentralized storage of electricity, benefiting management of 
the electric system and offering another revenue stream to EV drivers. The 
potential interactions between an electric vehicle fleet and the power grid 
often referred to as “Vehicle to grid power” or V2G (Kempton and Tomić, 
2005a, 2005b). These services are complex and involve diverse actors from 
different industries with different market and regulatory environments. 
Thissuggests that common action may be helpful in setting standards, regu-
latory frameworks, and common understandings of problems and potential 
solutions. More broadly, as electric cars become a significant fraction of the 
fleet, and if they are implemented along with an intelligent vehicle-to-grid 
system, would lead the whole electricity system to undergo an important 
paradigm change. Up to now, the electricity system is considered as tempo-
rally constrained, because electricity cannot be stored economically, thus 
the amount of storage available is very limited. Operationally, the lack of 
storage requires that generation must strictly equal electrical demand, also 
called load, in real time and at all times. The need for matching generation 
and load becomes more challenging as variable generation (e.g. wind and 
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solar power) increase to represent a larger fraction of the electric generation 
mix. Thus, large-scale EV introduction, or even just 10% EVs, along with the 
possibility of charging and discharging these cars in an intelligent way, will 
facilitate real-time management and greatly reduce the short-term need to 
precisely balance generation with load. A recent simulation of variable gen-
eration as 30%, 90%, and 99.9% of a regional transmission system shows that 
storage in EVs can make even 90% and more variable generation manageable 
(Budischak et al., 2013, also see Marrero et al., 2014; Lund and Kempton 2008).
Welfare economics suggest that an environmental tax reflecting the value 
of the marginal damage will provide incentives to achieve optimal lev-
els of technology substitution and development of clean power transport 
equipment. However, adopting such tax is difficult for three main rea-
sons: First, no firm consensus has yet been reached regarding the mar-
ginal damage of pollution, the health costs of car pollution and the eco-
nomic impact of various greenhouse gas emissions are diffuse and site 
specific. The problem is that the proposed tax amount must be a judg-
ment call based on a range of damage estimates with neither non-clear 
economic evaluation nor methodology (Owen, 2004 for a survey on this 
question). Second, a high level of tax is likely to be problematic in terms 
of public/political/social acceptability in times of hard budget constraint. 
Third, as any new technology, EV technologies meet classical entry barri-
ers, yet eco-taxation may not be sufficient to overcome these barriers.
From the public economics perspective, policy instruments designed to 
promote EV diffusion and V2G development can therefore be justified 
because the market under-supplies EV relative to the socially optimal one, 
due to the existence of such barriers. However two problems here may 
arise: First is the well-know logical problem of public action creating a dis-
tortion in the market willing to manage an externality issue. It is clearly 
not a first best solution to combine two bad signals (externality and distor-
tion to correct it) to create an efficient one (Owen, 2004). In this respect, 
on operational solution has been to apply a try and error process in the 
definition of the distortion introduced to promote EV diffusion.
The second possible problem is the social burden of the public support 
designed. For any policies involving expenditures (see Table 1, below) govern-
ment has also to control the cost of policies. If subsidies are greater than the 
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cost to provide the service, there may be redistributive effects of EV develop-
ers’ surplus, which would constitute a windfall gain for the industry. Given 
that EVs are still expensive, and that EV demand does not seem excessive as 
of this writing (July, 2014), and given that at least one study suggests that 
the US EV purchase subsidy is about right to bridge the gap between cost to 
produce and willingness to pay (Hidrue et al., 2011), this may not currently 
be a problem. However, if subsidies go to manufacturers who do not lower 
prices, or if subsidies become more than needed to sustain an initial market, 
that would be an industry windfall paid directly by the taxpayers through 
higher taxes or reduction of other public activities. Some part of windfall 
gain could be reallocated in a socially efficient way, for example by further 
investment in R&D by developers, yet there is no guarantee that this will 
strictly happen. A legitimate concern for the public authority therefore is to 
ensure that the burden on taxpayers is efficiently set.
According to the existing literature (Perdiguero and Jiménez, 2012; Leurent 
and Windisch, 2011) and to the analysis of the main successful EV public 
policies program developed in Norway (Haugneland, 2014), we will assume 
that proactive policy intervention should take place in a coordinated set 
of dimension to be efficient: here we propose three dimensions that to us 
seem complementary and necessary to foster the development of an EV 
industry.
The paper is structured as follow: Section 2 will present the first type of 
intervention namely the direct action toward the cost of acquisition of the 
EV. In this respect, EVs are nowadays characterized by relatively high ini-
tial capital cost per car, but very low running costs. This characteristics can 
made EVs financially unattractive compared with traditional fuel cars using 
classical evaluation techniques based upon the lifetime of the asset called 
“Total Cost of Ownership”. Section 3 will deal with the definition of EV tech-
nical standards, since these have an impact on charging strategies, which in 
turn affect both the car’s usability for transport, and the electric distribution 
network’s ability to reliably supply electricity. Uncoordinated development 
due to standards wars, often leads to the waste of private resources (winner 
take all situation). Section 4 will discuss the evolution of the grid rules, reg-
ulations and remunerations traditionally paid to power plant or centralized 
electricity storage facilities. EVs and decentralized batteries can be a great 
help for the real-time management of electric networks by providing electric 
services such as capacity guaranty, frequency regulation services, spinning 
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reserves, storage to smooth variable generation, and in the long run may also 
offer peak load shaving capabilities. Last section will conclude.
2. POLICIES FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLE 
DIFFUSION: FROM DIRECT SUBSIDIES 
TO MORE COORDINATED ACTIONS
In this section, we will start by a comparison of petrol drive train and 
electric cars in terms of costs. Then we follow by a review of the existing 
subsidies schemes and their economic impacts. We end this section by a 
presentation of the Norwegian public policy regarding coordinated public 
action in favor of EVs.
2.1. Relative cost of electric and petrol drive trains
Today, the acquisition of an EV at a price between 19-45,000 €, with a 
35kWh battery and 150 km range is much more than the cost of the equiv-
alent thermal car (Lemoine et al., 2008). The private consumers’ willing-
ness to pay is enough for a small market, but not strong enough to create 
a large market at today’s prices (Hidrue et al., 2011). Lithium-ion battery 
technology is currently the single largest contribution to higher EV vehi-
cles prices. Since the cost of Lithium-ion vehicle-class batteries is projected 
to drop by 50% over the next 7 years (Galves, 2011), battery costs may not be 
a long-term cost barrier to introduction.
However, the limited driving range of EVs, combined with slow charging, 
are their main drawbacks. Taking a tradeoff between battery cost, weight, 
and consumer need for minimum range, a typical full-function vehicle 
today might have a 150 km range, based on a 22 kWh lithium-ion battery. 
The range for 22 kWh can be calculated using the standard New European 
Driving Cycle1 (NEDC). In practice, actual range achieved depends hea-
1 The New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) is a driving cycle designed to assess the 
emission levels of car engines and fuel economy in passenger cars (excluding light 
trucks and commercial vehicles). It is also referred to as MVEG cycle (Motor Vehicle 
Emissions Group). The NEDC aims to represent the typical usage of a car in Europe. 
It consists of four repeated ECE-15 urban driving cycles (UDC) and one Extra-Urban 
driving cycle (EUDC).
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vily on weather conditions (especially temperature) and on an EU driving 
cycle type, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Typical maximal driving distance for a 22 kWh battery electric 
vehicle (source: CAE 2011)
Typical maximal driving distance22 kWh BEV 
NEDC cycle, temperate climate 160 km
NEDC cycle, winter (outside temperature -5°C) 97 km
Motorway cycle (speed 100 km/h), winter 92 km
Urban Cycle, winter 79 km
Such a short EV range is primarily due to a much higher cost per unit of 
energy storage than the storage cost of liquid fuels. A secondary reason for 
this short range is the smaller specific energy of batteries (200 Wh/kg for 
Li-ion) than gasoline (around 12 kWh/kg), but the larger weight and size is 
easily managed in vehicles designed from the ground up as EV, such as the 
Tesla Model S with its 85 kWh battery option. A vehicle with test results 
like those presented in Table 2 might be advertised as “150 km range, less 
in winter” or might be advertised as “range of 100 km to 150 km range”.
Before discussing policies designed to address the cost of EV batteries, we 
shall analyze the relative cost of EV and petrol vehicles. The cost of an EV 
without the battery is comparable to the cost of an entire gasoline vehi-
cle. This is not exactly correct, today the cost of an EV even without the 
battery is more than the cost of a comparable gasoline vehicle, but this is 
likely to shift as EV component production becomes more cost-effective 
with mass production. Also, maintenance costs are considerably lower on 
an EV, but that is not quantified nor certified at the time of purchase and 
we do not include it here. But taking these simplifications, we can com-
pare the cost of the EV battery and electricity cost, versus gasoline fuel 
cost, to get a quantitative comparison of the incremental cost of EVs over 
gasoline vehicles.
First a comparison must be made between internal combustion vehicles 
(ICV) and battery electric vehicles (BEV) for characteristics such as motor 
power, weight, tank capacity, range, weight/power ratio (table 2). As elec-
tric vehicles are mainly small urban cars, we have compared the Peugeot 
ion and Renault Zoe with two ICVs Peugeot 208, with either gasoline or 
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diesel engine. Moreover we have considered ICV consumptions given by 
automakers for urban trips.









Energy source Li-ion Li-ion Gasoline Diesel
Motor power (kW) 47 65 50 50
Tank capacity (l)   50 50
ICV Consumption (l/100km) 
urban driving cycle
  5,2 4,4
NEDC range (km) 
(moderate climate)
150 200   
Consumption (Wh/km) 107 110 510 466
Tank capacity (kWh) 16 22 492,5 530
Curb weight (kg) 1065 1430 975 1050
Ratio weight/power (kW/kg) 0,044 0,045 0,051 0,048
Energy conversion factors:
Gasoline –> 9,8 kWh/l
Diesel –> 10,6 kWh/l
Sources: companies’ data.
Table 2 shows that all these vehicles are designed with a similar weight/
power ratio. In this example the Peugeot cars have similar motor power 
and curb weight. Energy consumption per kilometer is much lower for 
BEV because an electric motor has a higher efficiency (90%-95%) than an 
internal combustion engine (25-30% for the optimal operating point). These 
energy consumptions are rather optimistic as it is well known that they 
are difficult to reach under normal driving conditions. Then, the follow-
ing values are therefore used to calculate these costs: we assume a BEV effi-
ciency of 175 Wh/km (280 Wh/mile) (Pearre et al., 2013), and a gasoline ICV 
efficiency of 6 l/100 km (39 MPG).
Typical driverd will use their car 200 to 300 days per year, and will charge 
the battery every day whatever the daily Depth of Discharge (DoD). For 
automotive applications, a battery must be replaced when its capacity 
has dropped to 80% of its original capacity. According to batteries data-
sheets, the battery lifespan decreases with DoD from 10 000 cycles to 1 500 
cycles for DoD in the range 20% to 95% (Peterson, 2010). Nevertheless, 
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measurements made on battery cells by Peterson (2010) have shown that 
more cycles are required. Due to the lack of large test cases, the issue of bat-
tery aging remains an open question. Finally we consider that each battery 
has up to one cycle per day, and a ten year life-time expectancy in agree-
ment with a stated Li-ion battery cycle life, 1000 - 3000 cycles [UBS2013].
From Gross (2011) we assume the projected battery costs2 from a projection 
made in 2009 at 500 €/kWh ($650), actual 2012 battery costs at 365 €/kWh 
($475) and projected 2020 costs of 210 €/kWh ($275). The battery manage-
ment system is considered to represent an additional cost of 40%.
For cost comparisons, we assume urban vehicles (Peugeot iOn and 208) 
travel 10 000 km (6,000 miles) per year. Each year’s travel has battery 
wear and fuel purchase costs.For a 16 kWh battery, assuming a 10 year life, 
each year’s proportional yearly cost is respectively 1 120 €, 818 € and 470 €. 
Fuel for 10 000 km in a year is 5 880 kWh (600 l) for the ICV, and 1 750 kWh 
for BEV. We use an electricity price of 0.1€/kWh (average retail for France 
and the US, lower than much of the EU but perhaps appropriate for off-
peak rates), and a gasoline price of 1.5€/l (EU average).
In table 3, the cost is first compared as a nominal euro yearly cost, equiv-
alent to a 0% discount rate, on the third to last row. On the second to last 
row, we also calculate total present cost, using a discount rate equal to 20% 
of the fuel cost difference between gasoline and electricity. Such a high 
discount rate is appropriate for consumer purchases, and also consistent 
with Hidrue et al. (2010) finding that five years of gasoline cost are fac-
tored into consumers’ willingness to pay for an electric vehicle. The last 
row gives the same results, but for a 22 kWh battery.
These results show that, at a 0% discount rate a BEV with a 16kWh will 
make sense very soon, and it already makes sense with the 20% discount 
rate. Of course, for a 22 kWh battery, it will take several more years. Such 
results depend on the distance driven per year. As the energy cost is much 
lower for BEV, the more you drive, the faster the battery cost is recovered. 
Thus, at 0% discount rate the breaking points in 2012 for a 16 kWh and 
22 kWh batteries are respectively 11 000 km and 15 000 km per year.
2 We should note that even the “2012 actual” price varies considerably as reported 
from auto manufacturers.
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Table 3. Comparison of fuel + storage cost for EV and thermal vehicles 
(assumptions in text)

















Distance (km/year) 10000 10000 10000 10000
Energy cost, gasoline or 
electricity (€/kWh)
0,15 0,1 0,1 0,1
EV consumption  
(Wh/km)
 175 175 175
ICE consumption 
(l/100km)
6    
Energy cost (c€/km) 9 1,75 1,75 1,75
     
Battery cost (€/kWh)  500 365 210
16kWh battery cost (€)  8000 5840 3360
Tank cost or BMS cost (€) 75 3200 2336 1344
Yearly storage (battery 
and BMS)  
degradation over 10 years 
life €/year
0 1120 818 470
Fuel (kWh/year) 5880 1750 1750 1750
Fuel cost (€/year) 900 175 175 175
Ten years total cost  
(fuel & storage)
9000 12950 9926 6454
Total net present cost for 
EV with a 16 kWh bat-
tery (capital cost + 20% 
consumer discount rate 
on fuel cost difference)
 11500 8476 5004
Total net present cost for 
EV with a 22 kWh bat-
tery (capital cost + 20% 
consumer discount rate 
on fuel cost difference)
 15700 11542 6768
Sources: author’s calculation based on company data.
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In 2012, and assuming a consumer discount rate of 20%, the EV with a 
22 kWh battery has a net present cost that is 6 700 euros higher than an 
ICV – surprisingly close to the purchase incentives of several OECD coun-
tries (see below), so the amount of purchase subsidy is sensible in relation 
to this analysis, for 2012 prices. As shown in the table 3, the subsidy may 
not need to remain static, as the differential cost is forecast to drop. These 
changing subsidy levels required, and the sustainability of the subsidies, 
are addressed in the next section.
2.2. Sustainability of EV purchase subsidies
Several developed countries have introduced directly tax-funded pur-
chase subsidies to promote the local EV industry, often a direct pay-
ment, tax credit, or tax exemption to each electrical vehicle buyer. 
These are shown for a number of OECD countries3 in Table 4. In some 
federal countries like the US (Knittel, 2012), additional help may be pro-
vided at the state level ($6 000 in tax credit in Colorado), and/or in 
some municipalities (up to $2 500 added to the Federal subsidy). The 
rationale of purchase subsidies, which reduce the above-analyzed buyer 
cost premium over gasoline vehicles, is twofold: they provide environ-
mental and fuel saving benefits of replacing gasoline and diesel cars, 
and they stimulate the country’s ability to produce new, high-technol-
ogy and presumably future-oriented cars.
In some countries like France, government subsidy of EVsis funded 
through a fee bate system (“bonus-malus”) that rewards low CO2 emitting 
cars and fines higher-emitting cars in a self-financing system. Unlike a 
system trying to fund increasing EV sales from tax revenues, the self-
financing French system is sustainable as long as the relative fees and the 
number of EV versus polluting vehicles are balanced in each year4. Since 
2013 the French system has been modified to a decrease at 6300 € and the 
last debate to date (July 2014) is to increase it to 10 000€ if it combined 
with the destruction of an old polluting diesel car.
3 The new French government raised the bonus in July 2012 to 7000€.
4 Penalty paid according to the CO2 emission * sold cars of that category >EV subsidy 
* numbers of EV for a year.
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Table 4. Public subsidies for EV purchase in example developed countries
Subsidies toward EV purchasing in 2012
Amsterdam 15 000 € Norway 0 € but 25% VAT rebate
Australia 0 Ontario 8500 CAD
Belgium 8 990 € Portugal 5 000 €
China 60000 Yuan Romania 5 000 €
Denmark 29 300 € Spain 6 000 €
France 7 000 € Taiwan 300$
Germany 0 € UK 5000£
India 1 100 000 Rs USA 7500$
Ireland 5 000 €   
Sources: http://www.evsroll.com/Electric_Car_Subsidy.html
Two questions should be raised here: first is the rational calculus beyond 
the level of the financial help and its stability through time. The second 
question is the cost control criterion of any public policy. If we combine 
the stated objectives or goals of EV sales in different countries, the sum 
by the year 2020 will be 7 million plug-in vehicles (IEA 2011, see figure 1). 
Figure 1. National goals or projections for EV and Plug in Hybrids in 2020
Sources: IEA (2011)
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Our first remark is linked to the total cost of achieving the national goals set by 
governments. The total national cost of EV purchasing subsidies would be very 
high if these IEA figures were correct. For example, a country with a 5 000 € 
subsidy and achieving a goal of 1 million plug-ins per year by 2020 would be 
paying 5 billion € per year in purchase subsidies. A cost control mechanism is 
needed. It can be in total outlay, in time duration, or in total numbers of cars. 
For example, the US purchase subsidy is larger for vehicles with larger bat-
teries, is capped at a $7,500 tax credit granted to the purchaser, and for each 
manufacturer it is phased out in steps over six months once the manufacturer 
reaches a total of 200,000 qualifying vehicles (US Dept of Energy, 2012).
We consider that it will help the development of the EV market to have 
this type of ex ante safeguard both to limit taxpayer cost and to avoid 
subsequent reactions against growing subsidies (Finon and Perez, 2007; 
Glachant and Perez, 2011). We believe that in order to frame the market 
the subsidies should be tailored to provide a clear, sustainable and predict-
able future to the EV industry over the next five to eight years. Economic 
history teaches that badly calibrated public interventions may be chal-
lenged by citizens (nuclear in Japan or Germany), by other industrial 
actors (Solar or Wind energy subsidies are today challenged by classical 
electricity generators and fuel suppliers) or by a change in the governing 
party (industrial stop-and-go policies in the UK in the 60th and 70th).
Our second remark is driven by the two last years of public policy toward 
EV and their results in terms of private sales. In the following figure, we 
have collected data about EV sales in different countries. This data collec-
tion is not easy to collect owing the lack of clear international database, so 
we have collected raw data from different sources in the following figure.
Matching public policy incentives and private sales is not an easy task. 
Even if governments want customers to buy EVs and they set for them some 
direct monetary incentives (see table 4) and sometimes-indirect advantages 
(see table 6), real private decisions about buying EVs are below expecta-
tions. Arguments to justify this gap are multiple. Some derive from the 
comparison between the relative performance of EVs and internal combus-
tion vehicles (ICVs (see table 5). As the two products are not strictly equiva-
lent in terms of performances, only a small fraction of the consumers have 
chosen the EVs to replaces their internal combustion vehicles even if pub-
lic policy support reduces the acquisition cost of the EVs.
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Figure 2. EV Sales in 5 leading countries in 2012 and 2014
Table 5. Comparison of relative performance of EVs and ICCs
EVs ICVs
Price per new car Minimum 23k€ Minimum 7500€
Driving range 150 km 400 km-600km
Time to refuel From 30min to 6hours 6min
Life time Unknown for the battery 
pack
Years
CO2 emissions 0 emission while run-
ning; Some according to the 
energy mix while charging
From 90 g to 250g/km
Noise pollution inside 
and outside the car
Very low Function of the technology
Energy cost for 100 km 1€to 2€/100 km 4-15 liters/100km *  
price per liter
Ancillary services 
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In the following section we will see how Norwegian public policy have suc-
ceeded in setting a more dynamic EVs environment by combining direct 
and indirect incentives in favor of EV adoption. 
2.3. The Norwegian EV success story
For many national and international observers, Norway is the leading coun-
try in terms of EVs adoption by private households. In July 2014 there were 
over 33,000 electric cars registered in Norway in a population of 5 million. 
This makes Norway the world leader for the adoption of electric cars.
Figure 3. Registered cars in Norway in July 2014
Sources: Gronnbil (2014)http://www.gronnbil.no/statistikk/?lang=en_US
According to Haugneland (2014) the benefits for electric car owners in 
Norway include monetary and non-monetary elements defined and 
adjusted over the last 20 years. For this author, the Norwegian EV success 
story is explained by the combination of different and complementary ele-
ments to make EVs attractive to private users: first in a national perspec-
tive is the fact that no purchase taxes (extremely high for ordinary cars) 
are applied to EVs. In the same vein, EVs have been granted an exemp-
tion from 25% VAT on purchase. They have also no charges on toll roads to 
paid. In terms of local public policies, EVs enjoy a free municipal car parks 
access and have free access to bus lanes in rush hours to facilitate their 
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mobility. In addition, to alleviate the range anxiety problem and to sus-
tain this large fleet of private EVs, there are registered 1,200 charging sta-
tions with 5,500 charging points5.
The sum of the direct and indirect benefits provided by the Norwegian 
public authorities at the national and local levels make the electric car 
competitive with traditional cars. Because of high purchase taxes on tra-
ditional cars, the electric cars are only marginally more expensive than 
a comparable gasoline car. The price difference in Norway is much more 
favorable to EVs than in many other countries. As electricity in Norway is 
cheap (0.11 Euro/kWh) and gasoline expensive (1.9 Euro/liter), the result is 
that the running cost for electric vehicles is cheap compared to traditional 
cars. The combination of these benefits compensate for the limited range 
and uncertain price on the second hand market for electric cars. Figure 4 
shows the efficiency of the Norwegian public policy to make the compara-
ble EV car cheaper than it’s ICC version.
Figure 4. Total Cost of Ownership comparison
Sources: http://www.avem.fr/actualite-voiture-electrique-une-etude-confirme-le-role-
cle-des-politiques-fiscales-5009.html
5 Sources: gronnbil (2014) http://www.gronnbil.no/ladepunkter, in July 2014.
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Lastly to manage the “stop and go of public policy” problem, the Norwegian 
parliament guarantees the purchase incentives until 2018 or until Norway 
reach 50,000 zero emission cars on Norwegian roads.
If we try now to compare the Norwegian system VAT free incentive to the 
French fee bate one, we will argue that both systems create distortions in 
the EV market. The Norwegian VAT free system creates an incentive to 
buy large and expensive EV cars (Tesla, Leaf, WV and BMW) whereas the 
French one is favoring the rather small and accessible EVs (Zoé, Kangoo, 
Leaf and Bluecar). According to level of this fee bate, the threshold of equal 
incentive between the two schemes (Q) moves down and up as described 
in table 6.
Table 6. Comparing French feebate and Norwegian VAT at 25% 
Feebate level in 2012 Feebate level in 2013-2014 Feebate level in 2015
7 000€ < Q*0,25 6 300 € < Q*0,25 10 000€<Q*0,25
Q = 28 000€ Q = 25 200€ Q = 40 000€
In the following section, we will deal with the question of policies toward 
charging stations.
3. POLICIES FOR CHARGING STATIONS
As important as the EV itself, widespread EV adoption will also require 
public access to Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE, also called charg-
ing stations). For the reasons mentioned above, the battery in a typical EV 
will provide less range than a typical gasoline vehicles. The availability 
of EVSE for en route charging can, to some extent substitute for a larger 
and more expensive battery. However, en route charging is impractical if 
charging rates are slow or if access is unavailable, out of the way, or cum-
bersome. To add on this, policies toward EVSE try to solve the EV chicken 
and egg conundrum. In fact, as EVs are not yet massively deployed, a large 
EVSE infrastructure is not necessary and it is not deployed, but, due to 
range anxiety, high battery cost and low distance issues, it is necessary to 
have a large EVSE to allow the massive deployment of EVs…
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3.1. EVSE types, costs, and charging functionality
Table 8 defines several types of EVSEs. The cost of the AC units is gener-
ally about 1 000 to 2000 € equipment cost, but cost jumps to the DC units at 
10 000 to 20 000 €. The installation costs vary greatly but given sufficient 
building electrical capacity, installation may range from under 500 € for 
units of less than 6 kW to 2 000 € for 20 – 30 kW, and to 3 000 – 4 000 € 
for 50 kW6.
The main difference between AC and DC charger is that the latter has 
an AC-DC converter built in to the EVSE: then the battery is fed through 
protective circuits by the EVSE. Although DC EVSE suppliers argue that 
this is the least expensive7, their calculation assumes that a separate 
charger would be added on-board the car. Rather, the most economical 
approach is to use the on-board motor drive converter for AC to DC con-
version during charging as several OEMs are already doing in produc-
tion or prototype units (e.g. Renault, BMW, Daimler, AC Propulsion). 
Presently, all manufacturers have some way of accepting AC charg-
ing, adding DC requires an additional connector and on-board circuits 
for DC protection. The charging levels shown in Table 4 are interesting 
because even the highest (50 kW) are already accomplished by the on-
board motor drive circuits, the latter being already scaled for the elec-
trical motor (e.g. 150 kW for the Mini-E, 80 kW for the Nissan Leaf and 
47 kW for the Peugeot iOn).
There is a surprising amount of confusion about the relative costs of these 
approaches within both the EV and EVSE industries. Although a wider 
recognition of the cost-effectiveness of using the motor drive for charg-
ing would be helpful, the much higher cost of DC charging units suggests 
they will not prevail in the marketplace without continuing awarding of 
large subsidies.
6 Approximate figures based on co-author Kempton’s experience designing EVSEs, bid-
ding installations at diverse buildings and parking areas in the US, and discussions 
with several EU entitles with diverse installation experience. Also see OVE (2011).
7 SGTE Power has sold these DC chargers since 1995. Their chargers use the CHAdeMO 
standard, and SGTE argues that this solution is the cheapest for the automakers 
because they don’t have to integrate a charger inside the vehicle.
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Table 8. EVSE power capacity and charging duration  
for a 22 kWh battery
EVSE capacity Charging duration at 80% of the battery capacities8
(1j) 230 V – 16 A 3,7 kW ~ 5 hours
(3j)  400 V – 16 A 11 kW ~ 2 hours
(1j) 230 V – 32 A 7,4 kW ~ 3 hours
(3j)  400 V – 32 A 22 kW ~ 1 hour
(3j)  400 V – 63 A 43 kW ~ 30 min
(DC)  500 V – 100 A 50 kW ~ 20 min
Most EV industries players agree that both slow and fast charging speeds9 
are required because they correspond to different needs, which can be 
approximately divided into three functional levels:
 − Slow charging (3-6 kW)is sufficient to be used at home or for dedi-
cated car parks, as vehicles are generally parked more than 5 hours;
 − Medium power charging (11 or 22 kW) at shopping centers, as people 
spend at least one or two hours for shopping;
 − Very fast charging (> 40 kW) for short stops during long trip or spe-
cific applications (taxi, high duty-cycle fleets), when charging last-
ing less than one hour charging – even if only partial charging – is 
required.
Already-standardized EV charge connectors (IEC 62196-2 for all coun-
tries, and SEA J1772 for only US and Japan) define communications so 
that the charging rate is the maximum allowed by either the car or 
EVSE. Thus an EV or EVSE capable of higher power charging will not 
over-load the other. Thus, home or work charging at rates higher than 
the above suggestions do no harm (other than higher EVSE costs), and 
may be useful for increased flexibility or greater potential for V2G ser-
vices, as described below.
8 Going for more than 80% is complex for two reasons: for heat generation when charg-
ing and for dynamic constraints inside the battery. 
9 Going for more than 80% extends the time required non-linearly for two reasons: for 
heat generation when charging and for dynamic constraints inside the battery. 
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3.2. Deployment of EVSEs;  
policy choices, public or private investment
States with early EV programs, such as California or Norway, have gen-
erally funded both EVSE and electricity for charging at public expense. 
Indeed, by comparing the cost of EV subsidies with the cost of en-route fast 
AC charging, it can be seen that the cost of subsidizing a single EV could 
equivalently be used to install a high-power AC EVSE in a public space en 
route and potentially serve thousands of EVs per year. Alternatively, for 
medium power units at locations such as shopping centers, they may add 
up to a large number and often the commercial location may be an incen-
tive to attract wealthy EV drivers during free charging time. Thus, there 
is an argument for private funding, possibly with some government incen-
tive. We can see each of these alternatives in various national cases today 
(ABI Research 2011; CGDD 2011).
Many countries have defined objectives for EV and EVSE roll-out, which 
may be accompanied by a model of where EVSEs are likely to be located. 
For example, in France, the general commissariat for sustainable develop-
ment (2011) plans 1.1 EVSE per EV for development up to 2020, and define 
main versus secondary EVSE locations, distinguishing between main (one 
EVSE per EV) and secondary (0.1 EVSE per EV) charging. Main charging 
places include residential private parking (0.6), workplace private parking 
(0.2), public parking (0.1), and street parking (0.1). By this definition, the 
EVSE investment for one million of EV is about 1.5 billion euros up to 2020, 
but less than 20% are in public places10.
Finally, in our view EVSE policies should allow:
 − Reducing size thus cost of batteries
 − Plan for en-route locations for EVSE to serve longer trips not served 
by home or workplace charging, and as the Norwegian experiment 
clearly shows, a safety net of fast-charging stations around the main 
driving routes is a key issue.
10 The last figure announced by the French government in July 2014 is to have now 
7 millions EVSE for 2030, but without any details concerning the implementation 
of this new policy goal. http://www.automobile-propre.com/2014/06/18/transition-
energetique-10-000-e-bonus-les-voitures-electriques-7-millions-points-recharge/
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 − Reducing EVSE costs to increase their en-route number, and reduce 
accordingly range anxiety
 − Encouraging fast and very fast AC charging
One alternative for funding EVSE, would be to levy taxes on electricity 
delivered by public EVSE. For example, consider the case of France, with 
potentially 20% of the charging done with public EVSE. Then 100000 
vehicles driving 12000 km/year at 175 Wh/km would need 200 GWh of 
energy. Thus 40 GWh could be delivered by the public EVSE. With a 2.5c€/
kWh taxes (about 25% of the regulated tariff) a revenue of one million 
euro would be available for EVSE installation and maintenance. A second 
approach would be if business models would allow investment and main-
tenance in EVSEs by private firms, which would in turn require pay-
ment for charging11. A third option would be a small fee on gasoline and 
diesel fuel to be used for the initial rollout of EVSEs in public locations, 
like the current French vehicle purchase subsidy, this would be charging 
the polluting infrastructure in order to fund the replacement. Finally, 
there may be a role for transportation or other public entities to examine 
national roadways and travel data, in order to plan locations to install 
the EVSEs, in order to plan EVSEs where most needed by EV drivers mak-
ing trips longer than battery range.
4. POLICY FOR GRID SERVICES FROM EV
Electric power systems security depends on three fundamental character-
istics: (i) generation and demand must be balanced in real time, keeping 
frequency close to its rated value, (ii) voltage levels must be kept inside a 
classical +/-5% range around the rated value, and (iii) maximum capac-
ity of distribution equipment (transformers, lines) must be respected to 
prevent risks of over current or tripping. The first characteristic requires 
flexible generation to match demand. Hydro or gas-power plants are 
often used for this role. The current rapid increase in variable-generation 
renewable power sources is increasing the need for flexible generation or 
11 A fee of 0.5€/100km may not be enough for private EVSE investors and operators, so 
attractive business models would need to be found.
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storage12. Storage has the dual advantage of economically handling over-
generation, not just under-generation, and is also generally carbon-free.
The electric power networks and light vehicle fleet are exceptionally com-
plementary as systems for managing energy and power. Economic and 
engineering studies show that EVs fleet may profitably provide power 
to the grid when they are parked and connected to an electrical outlet 
(Kempton & Tomić, 2005a, 2005b). Since EVs are located on the low-voltage 
end of the electric system, they could also address local distribution con-
straints such as congestion or over/under voltage.
At the present time, some energy markets are more ready to accept EVs 
as a source. Due to the limited kWh size of EV batteries, they cannot eco-
nomically provide power for a long duration. For example, a 20 kWh bat-
tery with a 40 kW grid connection can provide 40 kW for 10 minutes for 
primary frequency correction; but to supply a 5-hour peak, no more than 
2 kW would be prudent to minimize battery depletion. On this basis, the 
markets suitable for EV grid services are frequency regulation, spinning 
reserves and the capacity market. We examine frequency regulation as an 
example of these possible markets.
4.1. Frequency control
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are the responsible organization 
that purpose is to ensure at all time the frequency constraint in a given 
geographical zone. For frequency control, Regulation up is used when sources 
are providing power to the grid, or when loads are reducing their demand. 
Conversely, regulation down allows sources to reduce power fed to the grid, 
or loads to increase their demand. Then EV that would participate to reg-
ulation up will discharge into the grid, and they will charge during regula-
tion down. EVs can provide a fast response (less than fifteen seconds, pos-
sibly within a second) for regulation purposes, faster than typical power 
plants now providing this service. Comparing frequency services in dif-
ferent power systems must be done very carefully because similar terms 
12 Theses are the solution for managing the flexibility problem for the generation part; 
some studies also explore the possibility to provide flexibility from demand side 
(Rious et al., 2012).
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may describe different services and remuneration profiles. For an intro-
duction to this diversity of services remuneration for regulated markets, 
see Rebours et al. (2007). As an illustration, PJM13 and ENTSO-E14 frequency 
control organizations are compared in table 9.
Table 9. Frequency control terms and markets  
at two TSO organizations


























Sources: Rebours et al. (2007)
More specific descriptions of how these different control schemes and 
markets work can be found in PJM and ENTSO-E documentation15. Suffice 
is to say here that EVs with batteries are potentially appropriate for all the 
services in Table 8, in the 30 minute and under requirement16.
13 PJM Interconnection LLC (PJM) is a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in 
the United States. It is part of the Eastern Interconnection grid operating an electric 
transmission system serving all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.
14 The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) 
is an association of Europe’s transmission system operators (TSOs) for electricity. 
It is a successor of ETSO, the association of European transmission system opera-
tors founded in 1999 in response to the emergence of the internal electricity market 
within the European Union.
15 PJM, and ENTSO-E (2012 a & b) for last update of theses issues. 
16 The open issue is the impact on the battery ageing, even if batteries life span may be 
more than thousands of cycles.
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4.2. Frequency reserve payment (FRP)
Analyzing the payment for these grid services is important for EV pur-
poses because, if appropriately transferred to the EV owner (less transac-
tion costs), it creates a reduction of the total cost of ownership of the car. 
Since markets and rules for these payments vary per TSO and national 
rules, we will present two TSOs with very different rules, the French 
regulated TSO pricing and the PJM market based. PJM frequency regu-
lation payments fluctuate with markets; over the past 4 years, payments 
have fluctuated from roughly $15 to $30 per MW, per hour of availability 
(12€ to 23€). In France,it is a regulated tariff with two components:
(a) A capacity payment for availability, requiring ability to hold the 
requested value for 30 minutes:
 − 8.04 €/MW for primary reserve
 − 9.30 €/MW for secondary reserve
(b) An energy payment per kWh when power is produced. This is only for 
secondary control (9.30€/MWh).




















Regulation up  
and down
4.3 – 43 (Th!nk City)






30 – 80 (Germany, coal 
fired power plants)
3.5 kW
Codani et al., 
2014a
France Regulation up 
and down
2 – 45 3kW, 7kW, 
23kW, 43kW
As calculated via the formulas of Kempton and Tomić (2005a), a car 
with18 kW of bidirectional capability, available 20 hours/week, could earn 
approximately 2 300€ at a recent $20/MW-h PJM market price, and about 
half that at a French price of 8.50€ per MW-h. In either case, if the driver 
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retained, say, 2/3 of the revenue, it would significantly improve the cost 
of ownership of the EV. Some other studies provide revenues for ancillary 
services for VtoG services as summarized in table 10.
Potential policies to further this revenue stream for EVs include making 
TSO not irrationally biased against distributed storage resources and to 
allow more market mechanisms to give the real value of the services pro-
vided by the different actors.
4.3. Definition of the Optimal TSO rules toward VtoG 
and implementation in the EU
According to Codani et al. (2014b) the optimal implementation of the TSO rules 
can be expected as displayed in table 11 by an international comparison of six 
existing rules framing the institutional arrangement toward VtoG services.
Based on these international best- worst existing practices, authors have 
collected, they define an ideal TSO for VtoG services in which almost no 
barriers to the building of EV coalitions exist. Conversely they also define 
the opposite, the worst possible institutional organization toward VtoG 
remuneration. Therefore in the best scenario, EVs are aggregated and par-
ticipate into electricity reserve markets in a fair way. In opposition in the 
worst scenario, EVs services are not paid and deliver to the electricity grid. 
In order to guide actual EU policies toward better rules for VtoG, authors 
have finally analyzed ENTSO-E proposal at the EU level and find some weak 
points in the project driven by ENTSO-E. For instance, the rules defining 
the minimum side of aggregation of EVs (R1) and the possible bonus for 
extra-flexibility (R6) are not addressed in ENTSO-E’s proposal and some 
additional efforts are expected to reach the optimal TSO goal.
Surprisingly some rules are not addressed within the network codes because 
they are left at the discretion of each TSO. We can see that there is a good 
correlation between the ENTSO-E guidelines and the ideal TSO. It seems 
that the network codes are paving the way to the implementation of a com-
plete Demand Side Response framework suitable for all new controllable 
loads. The rules of this ideal TSO would encourage the formation of EV coa-
litions, no matter neither their sizes nor their geographical expansions. All 
TSO services would be remunerated in a fair and just manner.
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Table 11. Comparison of TSOs rules to manage VtoG services





R1. Minimum Size of the 
fleet capacity for EVs 
aggregation
100kW 10MW Not addressed
R.2. Interoperability 
among multiple and 
local Distribution System 
Operators17
Possible Impossible Not clearly defined, but 
TSOs and DSOs should 
make all endeavors and 
cooperate in order to 
ease the participation 
R.3 Aggregation rule and 
payment precision




R.4 Nature of the payment 
received for the resource
Market based Regulated Market based








All ancillary services 
should be paid
R.6 Bonus for extra 
flexibility provided by BEVs
Set at the effi-
cient level
No existing Not addressed
Sources: Codani et al. (2014)
5. CONCLUSION
The change from liquid fuel to electricity for most light vehicles is a fun-
damental change, yet essential to make, to do so successfully and at good 
speed will require multilevel coordinated action to overcome the hurdles. 
To conclude, we have proposed three-dimensions of public policies toward 
EV and V2G – purchase subsidies, EVSE strategic development and remov-
ing barriers to the market for grid-services from EVs. In this paper, we 
have investigated current barriers to widespread EV deployment, reviewed 
the state of art of public policies toward these problems and proposed some 
remedies for each of the identified problems. We advocate integrated public 
17 More than 900 are existing in Germany and 215 in France (100 ERDF + 115 non nation-
alized local distribution companies).
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action to address these problems beyond the classical subsidy schemes for 
EVs. As the topic challenging, we invite further studies and analysis with 
the goal of making a robust frame for policies to develop, at last after mul-
tiple tries, the promise of an EV industry.
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